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The objective of the study is to examine possible presence of nonlinear speculative bubbles in 
the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE).  Bubbles are argued to exist when there are substantial 
deviations of market value from the estimated fundamental values. We estimate a series of 
fundamental values from a four variable Vector Autoregression Model (VAR) using the main 
KSE100 index along with measures of world stock prices, the Pakistani exchange rate, and the 
Pakistani short-term interest rate. Residuals of this estimated fundamental time series are then tested 
for possible speculative deviations using a Hamilton regime switching test and a rescaled range Hurst 
coefficient test, with a further test for nonlinearity beyond the ARCH effects using the BDS statistic. 
For all of these, we reject the null hypotheses of the absence of speculative bubbles and nonlinearities 
beyond ARCH in these series. While these results suggest the possible presence of such bubbles, we 
note methodological limits on proving that due to the problem of mis-specified fundamentals. We 
further discuss some characteristics of the regulatory environment that may make it especially 
susceptible to such phenomena and may be considered by the policy-makers for the attenuation of 
speculative and manipulative behaviour. 
Keywords: Bubble, Pakistan, Stock Market, Regime Switching, Rescaled Range 
Analysis, Nonlinearity 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Asset markets in emerging and frontier economies have exhibited high levels of 
variance with sharp increases followed by even sharper crashes. This has led to 
widespread discussion that these markets may be exhibiting speculative bubbles in which 
prices diverge from the fundamental values frequently [Ahmed, Rosser, and Uppal (2010, 
2014)]. Among the markets that have been showing such behaviour very markedly has 
been the Karachi Stock Exchange. The main equity market of Pakistan apparently 
presents a case of either an ongoing long-term bubble or of recurring bubble. The 
unprecedented performance of the KSE over the over the 2001-2014 period in particular 
remains a puzzle to many observers in view of the relatively poor performance of the real 
sectors of the country’s economy. Though alternative explanations, such as structural 
reforms, favourable tax and regulatory treatment, and technicalities of the stock index 
construction, have been offered, the existence of speculative bubble, and the possibilities 
of manipulative behaviour cannot be precluded. It is particularly imperative to examine 
the questions whether the stock market presents a case of a long-term or a recurring 
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bubble for its implication both for the theory of speculative bubbles as well as for its 
policy implications. While such bubbles are regarded as destabilising and disruptive to 
the economy in many ways, these are especially detrimental to sustaining confidence in 
the fairness and efficiency of the financial markets and to the flow and allocation of real 
investment that is crucial to the development process. 
In this paper we use well-developed methodologies to consider KSE’s behaviour 
more rigorously. The next section describes the historical performance of the KSE 
indices, noting some popular explanations for its meteoric rise. This is followed by a 
section on the theory of speculative bubbles. The third section explains our methodology 
and data used in the study, which is followed by a section on the empirical results. The 
final section summarises our findings and presents the conclusions. In brief, we find that 
there is a strong evidence to suggest that this market has been exhibiting speculative 
bubbles characterised by substantial nonlinearities. 
 
HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE OF THE KARACHI STOCK MARKET 
The market’s benchmark index, Karachi Stock Exchange 100 Index (KSE100) was 
launched in November 1991 with a base of 1,000 points.
1
 By the beginning of 2001, it had 
move up to 1508 registering a steady but modest annualised growth rate of 4.5 percent (Refer 
to Figure 1). The market started to take off right after Pakistan became a major player in the 
war on terror following the 9-11 terrorist attacks in the US. The KSE100 index skyrocketed to 
15,122 by the end of April in 2008, by ten folds, registering a record breaking growth of 31 
percent per year. Meanwhile the markets around the world registered a nominal growth rate of 
only 0.47 percent in the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) World Index, and the 
emerging markets a growth of 17.4 percent in the MSCI Emerging Market Index); Figure 2 
provides visual comparisons. However, tightening of the monetary policy by the State Bank 
of Pakistan and an unexpected increase in the interest rates in May 2008, combined with 
adverse political events and the onset of the Global Financial Crisis, ushered a period of 
crashing stock prices. By July the index had plunged by one-third of its peak value. In an 
effort to stabilise the financial markets the regulators set a floor for stock prices on August 28 
effectively shutting down the market till December 15 when the floor on stock prices was 
removed and the trading resumed. 
 
Fig. 1. KSE100 Index — 1992–2013 
 
 
1KSE100 is a market capitalisation weighted index of 100 companies with the highest market 
capitalisation. However, the company with the highest market capitalisation from each sector is also included to 
make it more representative of the market. 
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Fig. 2. KSE Comparative Performance —Local Currency Denominated Indices 
 
 
Table 1 
Karachi Stock Exchange Summary Statistics 
Year 1989 1993 1997 2001 2005 2009 2013 
No. of Listed Companies 440 653 781 747 661 651 569 
Market Capitalisation 
   (mil. US $) 2,457 11,602 10,966 4,944 45,937 33,238 56,083 
Market Capitalisation as Percentage 
of GDP 6.50% 23.90% 17.40% 6.90% 42.00% 19.80% 15.89% 
Trading Value (mil. US $) 231 1,844 11,476 12,455 140,996 23,526 70,406 
Turnover Ratio (%) 8.00% 18.70% 103.70% 226.80% 375.70% 82.94% 91.48% 
P/E Ratio* 8 27.6 14.8 7.5 13.1 3.9 6.7 
Price to Book Value* 1.3 4.2 2.3 0.9 3.5 1.2 2.6 
Dividend Yield (%)* 8.30% 1.50% 3.20% 12.50% 2.50% 9.21% 8.87% 
% Change in KSE100  Index      
(Over Previous Period) – 680.50% –19.00% –27.40% 650.60% –1.78% 169.11% 
 
Right after the re-opening of the market it recovered quickly reaching new highs. 
The KSE100 index which had dropped to 5865 by the end of 2008 continued to rise at a 
rapid pace. By the end of September 2012 it registered new all-time highs surpassing the 
previous peak of 15,622. Since then its pace has accelerated and the index’s most recent 
value stands as of 7/1/2014 at 29,702, thus it has increased at a 29 percent annualised rate 
since its bottom at the end of 2008.  In comparison, the MSCI Index for Frontier Markets 
increased by an annualised rate of 8 percent over this period. 
The unprecedented performance of the Karachi Stock Exchange over the last 14 
years remains a puzzle to many observers. It is particularly so in view of the relatively 
poor performance of the real sectors of the country’s economy. Over the period 2001-
2013 period the economy grew at a rate below the rate experienced by peer countries, 
except for the years 2004 and 2005 (see Figure 4). The country has been beset by a host 
of political and economic issues which are a continuing drag on the economy. These 
include a deteriorated law and order situation, persistent incidence of terrorist attacks, 
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unsettled political structures, and irresolute economic policies. The weakening economic 
condition is exacerbated by extraordinary energy shortages, which have inhibited much 
of the economic life. Being situated next to on-going ISAF
2
 anti-insurgency operations in 
Afghanistan, the country is itself in virtual war conditions, besides facing internal 
insurgencies, as well as sectarian and ethnic conflicts. The sharp contrast between the 
performance of the real sector and the stock market is, therefore, prima facie evidence of 
a speculative market bubble. However, in this case, it seems that either the market has 
remained diverged from its fundamentals over a long period of time, or it keeps on 
spawning new speculative bubbles.  
Observers of the KSE’s extraordinary performance have advanced 
explanations based on both technical and fundamental factors. Some explain that the 
market performance in the recent years may be reflective of the country’s potential 
buoyed by the country’s strengthening of democratic institutions and financial 
markets, continued lending by international financial institutions, and general 
enthusiasm for ―frontier markets‖ on the part of international investors [The 
Economist (2013)]. The market’s continuing rise is also attributed to special tax and 
disclosure treatment afforded to it by the regulators, such as an amnesty scheme that 
allows investors to buy stocks with no questions asked about the source of funds, and 
lower or no tax on capital gains. Critics have pointed out that such provisions open 
wide possibilities for money laundering legally, and have been the major impetus for 
cash inflows into the stock market, especially considering rather lax enforcement on 
part of the market regulators [Houreld (2013)]. A number of analyses also point to 
the fact that the Price/Earning (P/E) ratios of the Pakistani companies do not seem to 
be excessive compared to P/E ratios for other emerging market companies. Besides, a 
high rate of inflation and a deteriorating currency value over the years contribut e to 
the apparent rise in nominal value of the index which is denominated in the local 
currency. Figure 3 plots the dollar denominated Emerging Markets and Frontier 
Markets MSCI indices, and indeed in comparison, the KSE’s does not appear to be 
excessively far off from the others, while still running higher.  
 
Fig. 3.  KSE Comparative Performance— US $ Denominated Indices 
 
 
2ISAF—International Security Assistance Force. 
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Fig. 4.  Comparative Growth Rates in GDP 
 
 
Among the technical reasons possibly explaining this outcome, one focus has been 
the structure and methodology of the KSE100 Index. The index is constructed using the 
Market Capitalisation Method. Since the KSE capitalisation is concentrated in a handful 
of stocks, the Index is also dominated by a few stocks and sectors of economy and tends 
to reflect the performance of the companies with the highest capitalisation, inflating 
market performance as compared to the overall corporate sector and the economy [Iqbal 
(2008)]. The stock market lacks breadth as well as depth and liquidity; only 60 of its 569 
listed companies trade regularly. The 10 largest stocks accounted for 74 percent of the 
total market capitalisation as of 9 July 2013. Trading of stocks is likewise highly 
concentrated. Free float is rather limited; an average of only 20 percent of the shares of 
the listed companies are available for trading, resulting in relatively low market liquidity. 
This feature coupled with a high turnover paints a picture of a highly speculative market. 
Thus, it is claimed that the KSE 100 Index does not represent the economy or the 
corporate sector. Therefore, other indices have been advocated as alternatives, such as the 
KSE-30, or the MSCI Pakistan Index. The former is based on only on the free-float of 
shares, rather than on the basis of paid-up capital and is adjusted for dividends and right 
shares (formally implemented from September 1, 2006 with base value of 10,000 
points).The latter is designed to measure the performance of the large and mid-cap 
segments of the Pakistan market. With 12 constituents, the index covers approximately 
85 percent of the Pakistan equity universe. 
In this paper we document and analyse the behaviour of Pakistan’s equity market 
for presence of speculative bubbles using established empirical methodologies. In order 
to address issues of inflation and foreign exchange, we construct a four-variable VAR 
model which includes in addition to the KSE100 index, foreign exchange rate against US 
dollar, and the interest rate series which would reflect the expected inflation. 
 
THEORY OF SPECULATIVE BUBBLES 
A speculative bubble involves an asset market dominated by agents purchasing an 
asset with the expectation that its price will rise in some near term future so that they can 
make a capital gain within a relatively near term period.  This then leads the price to rise 
above the long run fundamental value, presumably based on the present value of a 
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rationally expected future stream of net real returns properly discounted.  While there is a 
long and classic literature arguing for the historical existence of such bubbles going back 
centuries [Kindleberger (2000)], theoretical literature faces certain complications.  The 
first is that it is difficult to reconcile such agent behaviour with the assumption of 
rationality.  Indeed, Tirole (1982) argued that bubbles will not happen in a world of 
infinitely lived, perfectly informed rational agents, operating in discrete time markets.  
Due to the idea that the bubble must end at some point and it will not be rational to be 
holding the asset in the period before it ends, an assumption of common knowledge feeds 
a backward induction argument to show that it is irrational to become involved in the 
bubble to begin with.   
However, rational bubbles may be possible as some of these assumptions are 
relaxed.   Thus, Tirole (1985) showed that allowing finitely lived agents in overlapping 
generations models can pass a stationary bubble on to later generations, with this 
argument having been made for the long run existence of a stable fiat money (whose 
fundamental value is zero).  But stationary bubbles are not empirically observable as 
most tests for bubbles (such as those we use below) involve seeking to observe 
apparently rapid movements away from presumed fundamentals.  Such bubbles can be 
rational even if they are expected to crash in finite time but inflate at an accelerating rate 
that provides a risk premium for rational agents [Blanchard and Watson (1982)].  Such 
bubbles have been studied by various observers [Elwood, Ahmed, and Rosser (1999); 
Sornette and Zhou (2005)].     
The standard approach would be to identify a bubble by  
b(t) = p(t) – f(t) + ε(t)> 0  … … … … … … (1) 
where t is time period, b is bubble value, p  is price, f is the fundamental value, and ε is an 
exogenous stochastic noise process, usually assumed to be i.i.d. or even Gaussian normal, 
even though many asset returns are known to exhibit higher moments than do Gaussian 
distributions, such as skewness and kurtosis (―fat tails‖).  This formulation leads us to the 
other major problem in the theory of bubbles,  i.e., designing of a empirical tests for the 
presence of bubbles, namely how to tell  what is the fundamental  versus the bubble (or 
the stochastic noise process), with the price being the only item that is unequivocally 
identifiable.  This has been labeled the misspecified fundamental problem by Flood and 
Garber (1980) who argue that it is impossible to econometrically identify for certain a 
fundamental, although Ahmed, et al. (1997) have argued that one can observe 
fundamentals in closed-end country funds in the form of net asset values, with premia 
above those clearly constituting bubbles.  Any peculiar price movement that appears to 
deviate from a presumed fundamental may actually be a rationally expected fundamentals 
movement by agents, even if it proves ex post not to be justified.  After all, rational 
expectations simply mean being right on average, not all the time; errors can be made.  
Beyond this argument there are some who argue that the concept of a fundamental is 
theoretically empty due to fundamental uncertainty [Davidson (2004)] or because high 
frequency price changes are all that matter [Bouchaud and Potters (2003)].  In any case, 
we must recognise for our study here that we are not fully able to overcome the 
misspecified fundamental critique, and therefore must garnish our conclusions with a 
strong caveat acknowledging that we are not definitely proving the existence of bubbles 
in the KSE market, even if the evidence is highly supportive. 
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Rejecting the idea of considering rational bubbles is the idea that they are 
inherently irrational, perhaps most eloquently expressed by the title of Robert Shiller’s 
book Irrational Exuberance (2015).  In this psychological view agents become 
overwhelmed by excitement over prospective short term gains and underestimate and 
misprice the risks that they are engaging in.  Thus waves of optimism (or even ―mania‖) 
alternate with pessimism (or ―panic‖), with Kindleberger supporting this view. The 
earlier work of Hyman Minsky (1972) is also in this line of argument, arguing that 
financing standards become relaxed during the boom phase of a speculative bubble 
helping to push it upwards. 
In between the competing strands of the rational bubble literature is the view that 
there may be heterogeneous agents, some rational and some not.  Earlier literature 
[Baumol (1957); Zeeman (1974)] recognised this and saw bubbles arising as the less 
rational trend chasers came to dominate an asset market, only to be chased out by the 
rational fundamentalists when the bubble would crash, and the balance going back and 
forth in any given market over time.  This line of argument fell out of favour in the later 
1970s and in the 1980s as the rational expectations revolution took hold, but with the 
apparent occurrences of bubbles and crashes in many markets, beginning with the US 
stock market crash of 1987, this belief weakened.  The idea that some agents might not be 
rational was also argued by Black (1985), and DeLong, et al. (1991), who showed that 
the supposedly irrational ―noise traders‖ might actually do better (or at least some of 
them) than the rational fundamentalists and thus survive, the argument that such traders 
would lose money and be driven out of the market long being used to dismiss their 
possible existence.   
More recent theoretical study in which agents switch strategies over time is due to 
Föllmer, Horst, and Kirman (2005).  Such an approach has also been studied using agent-
based modeling of heterogeneous agents as has been done by Chiarella, et al. (2003), 
with Gallegati, Rosser, and Palestrini (2011) providing an example that can exhibit the 
phenomenon recognised by Minsky of a period of financial distress in a bubble, a period 
of gradually declining prices after a peak but prior to a full crash, which has been 
observed in many historical bubbles. 
 
METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
Following the initial approach of Canova and Ito (1991), we estimate our assumed 
fundamental value time series by estimating a Vector Autogressive (VAR) model using 
daily data for the KSE100 stock market index with daily data for world stock prices, the 
Pakistani foreign exchange rate, and the Pakistani middle 30-day Repo interest rate.  It is 
from this VAR model (with 8 lags) that we then estimate residuals that we apply our 
various tests of possible bubbles and nonlinearity on.   
The vector autoregression (VAR) is used to capture the linear interdependencies 
among multiple time series. A VAR model captures the evolution of a set of k endogenous 
variables  over the sample period (t = 1, ..., T) as a linear function of only their past values. 
These variables are collected in a k × 1 vector yt, which has as the ith element, yi,t, the 
observation at time ―t‖ of the ith variable. A p-th order VAR, denoted VAR(p), is: 
                                 … … … (2) 
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where the l-periods back observation yt−l is the l-th lag of y, c is a k×1 vector of constants, 
Ai is a time-invariant k×k matrix and εt is a k×1 vector of error terms; contemporaneous 
covariance matrix of error terms is Ω, and there is no across time or serial correlation in 
the individual error terms. In our model the four variables are as described above, 
KSE100 returns, short-term interest rates, the PKR/USD exchange rate and the MSCI 
World stock index. The lag-length of eight was found to be econometrically appropriate 
following usual criteria (SIC, BIC). Examination of the residuals (see Table 5) shows that 
the model residuals are well-behaved.  
As noted above, this is subject to the difficult-to-avoid misspecified fundamental 
problem.  We hope to capture expectations of discounted future streams of net returns for 
the stock market.  Some of the variables we use clearly affect this, most obviously the 
interest rate one. We are constrained by the fact that more specific and frequent estimates 
of the market fundamentals are just not available. Using GDP itself is also not useful 
given that it does not remotely vary on a daily basis. We presume that the exchange rates, 
interest rates and the world market index would reflect expectations of the market 
regarding the economic and stock expected cash flows. The world stock market index 
provides some estimate of expectations about future global economic performance, which 
should influence future Pakistani economic performance.  The Pakistani foreign 
exchange rate should provide some information regarding expectations of future 
Pakistani performance relative to global performance.  The interest rate provides 
information regarding both expected future performance as well as the discount rate for 
future returns. 
Before proceeding further we note that it might be worthwhile to test our 
method against other econometric ones derived from the set of theoretical mode ls of 
bubbles listed above, as well as others not discussed.  However, we note that there is 
a vast array of such methods and such a project would be a different paper rather than 
the one we are engaged in here examining the Karachi stock market in particular.  As 
it is there have been some studies attempting to survey the wide variety of such 
techniques, including Gurkayanak (2008) and Homm and Breitung (2012).  We take 
some comfort in the finding in this latter study that tests involving structural breaks  
have ―the highest power,‖ and our use of regime switching tests fits into this 
category. 
 
EMPIRICAL TESTS FOR SPECULATIVE BUBBLES 
This section describes the three empirical tests employed in the study. These are: 
(i) Regime Switching Test, (ii) Hurst Persistence Test, and (ii) Nonlinearity Test. 
 
(i)  Regime Switching Test 
Hamilton (1989) introduced an approach to regime switching tests that can be used 
to test for trends in time series and switches in trends, as used in Engel and Hamilton 
(1990) and van Norden and Schaller (1993).  We use this approach as our main test for 
the null of no bubbles on the residual series derived above which is given by 
t = nt + zt … … … … … … … (3) 
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where 
nt = 1 + 2st … … … … … … … (4) 
and   
zt – zt–1 = (zt–1 – zt–2) +…+ (z2 – z1) + 1  … … … … (5) 
with  an autoregressive function. 
with s = 1 being a positive trend, s = 0 being a negative trend, and μ1 0 indicating the 
possible existence of a trend element beyond the VAR process.  Furthermore, let: 
               Prob [st = 1  st-1 = 1] = p, Prob [st = 0  st-1 = 1] = 1 – p …. … (6) 
               Prob [st = 0  st-1 = 0] = q, Prob [st = 1  st-1 = 0] = 1 - q. … … (7) 
Following Engel and Hamilton (1990) a ―no bubbles‖  test proposes a null 
hypothesis of no trends given by p = 1 – q.  This is tested by with a Wald test statistic 
given by 
[p – (1 – q)]/[var(p) + var(1 – q) + covar(p, 1 – q)]. … … … (8) 
 
(ii)  Hurst Persistence Tests 
Hurst (1951) developed a test to study persistence of Nile River annual flows, 
which was first applied to economic data by Mandelbrot (1972).  This technique is also 
known as rescaled range analysis.  For a series xt with n observations, mean of x*m and a 
max and a min value, the range R(n) is: 
 ( )           ∑ (    
 )             ∑ (    
 )      … (9) 
The scale factor, S(n, q) is the square root of a consistent estimator for spectral 
density at frequency zero, with q < n,  
 (   )      ∑   ( )     ( )     
 
   
      … … … (10) 
with g’s autocovariances and w’s weights based on the truncation parameter, q, which is a 
period of short-term dependence.  Lo (1991) has criticised the used of the classical Hurst 
coefficient for studying long-term persistence due to this presence of short-term 
dependence in it, but this is not a problem for us.  The classical Hurst case has q = 0, 
which reduces the scaling factor to a simple standard deviation. 
Feller (1951) showed that if xt is a Gaussian i.i.d. series then 
R(n)/S(n)  nH, … … … … … … … (11) 
with H = 1/2, which implies integer integro-differentiation and thus standard Brownian 
motion, the ―random walk.‖  H is the Hurst coefficient, which can vary from zero to one 
with a value of 1/2 implying no persistence in a process, a value significantly less than 
1/2 implying ―anti-persistence‖ and a value significantly greater than 1/2 implying 
positive persistence.  The significance test involves breaking the sample into sub-samples 
(namely, pre-bubble, during-bubble and post-bubble period)  and then estimating a Chow 
test on the null that the sub-periods possess identical slopes. 
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(iii)  Nonlinearity Test 
We test for nonlinearity of the VAR residual series in two stages.  The first is to 
remove ARCH effects.  Engle (1982) the nonlinear variance dependence measure of 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) as 
        … … … … … … … (12) 
  
      ∑       
  
    … … … … … … (13) 
with  is i.i.d. and the I's different lags.  We use a three period lag and, as expected, 
significant ARCH effects in all series, available on request from the authors.   
The second stage involves removing variability attributable to the estimated 
ARCH effects from the VAR residual series for both models.   The remaining residual 
series is run through the BDS (Brock-Dechert-Scheinkman) test due to Brock, Dechert, 
LeBaron, and Scheinkman (1997), with useful guidance on certain aspects in Brock, 
Hsieh, and LeBaron (1991).  This statistic tests for generalised nonlinear structure but 
does not test for any specific form such as alternative ARCH forms or chaos. 
The correlation integral for a data series xt, t = 1, …, T results from forming m-
histories such that  x = [xt, xt+1, …, xt+m+1] for any embedding dimension m.  It is 
   ( )  ∑      (  
    
 ) 
 
  (    )
  … … … … (14) 
with a tolerance distance of , conventionally measured by the standard deviation divided 
by the spread of the data, I(xt
m
, xs
m
) is an indicator function equaling 1 if  |ixt
m
 - xs
m
I|< 
and equaling zero otherwise, and Tm = T – (m – 1). 
The BDS statistic comes from the correlation integral as 
BDS (m, ) = T1/2{cm() - [c1()]
m
}/bm … … … (15) 
where bm is the standard deviation of the BDS statistic dependent on the embedding 
dimension m.  The null hypothesis is that the series is i.i.d., meaning that for a given  
and an m > 1, cm() - [c1()]
m
 equals zero.  Thus, sufficiently large values of the BDS 
statistic indicate nonlinear structure in the remaining series.  This test is subject to severe 
small sample bias with a cutoff of 500 observations sufficient to overcome this, a 
minimum both of our daily series easily achieve. 
 
Results 
The results of the empirical tests are reported in Tables 2–5 and are summarised 
below. 
(i) Regime Switching Test: Results are reported in Table 2. The critical value for 
rejecting the null of no trends is χ2 = 3.84.  Clearly, the null of no trends is 
strongly rejected, given the reported value of 4076.68 for the test. 
(ii) Hurst Persistence Test: Table 3 presents the results of this test, for which the 
critical F-value for the Chow test is 6.4. Table 3 consists of four sub-tables. 
The first, 3A, is for the entire sample period.  The remaining three are for sub-
periods, with 3B for the period of steep decline between April 18, 2008 and 
January 26, 2009, with 3C being for a sub-period prior to that between 
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February 1992 and December 2001, while 3D is for the period from January 
2001 to November 2013.  These break the sample approximately between the 
period before the regional effects of the U.S. reaction to the 9/11 attacks 
happened and after they started happening.  For all of these cases, the 
estimated F-values easily exceed the critical value. Thus, the Hurst persistence 
test for both the entire sample as well as the three sub-samples significantly 
rejects the null of a value of 0.50, which would indicate no persistence.   
Again, we emphasise that the validity of these tests are subject to the caveat that 
we have estimated reasonably well the fundamental series for the asset time series 
process. 
(iii) Nonlinearity Test: Table 4 present the results of this test for embedding 
dimensions, m = 2 to 4 (m = 3 is conventional).  The critical value for 
rejecting the null of i.i.d. ranges from 4.70 to 6.92 for those three cases.  
Based on the estimated BDS statistics null is rejected as these estimated 
numbers range from 24.87 to 32.81. Thus, there appears to be remaining 
nonlinearity beyond basic ARCH in the VAR residual series.   
Of course, just as our earlier tests are subject to the validity of our original VAR 
specifications and the broader misspecified fundamental problem, likewise so is this test, 
which is further limited by our modification of the basic result with a basic ARCH adaptation. 
Thus, we also emphasise that the nature of the remaining nonlinearity remains unknown. 
 
Table 2 
 Wald Test Results on Residuals from the VAR Model 
VAR Variables: (i) KSE100 Index Returns, (ii) Exchange Rate, (iii) Pakistan Repo 30 
Day Middle Rate, and (iv) World Stock Index 
Sample Period H0: P1=1-P2 
February 28, 1992-November 25, 2013 4076.68 
Critical Value χ2(1)=3.84 
 
Table 3 
 Hurst Coefficients and Related Chow Tests 
Hurst Coefficients and Chow Test Results on Residuals from Four-Variable VAR Model 
of Pakistani Stock Returns, Exchange Rate, Pakistan Repo 30 Day Middle Rate and 
World Stock Index 
  Hurst 
Coefficient Computed F 
Table 3a       
   Full Sample Period February 28, 1992-November 25, 2013 0.59 1569* 
Table 3b     
   Sample Period April 18, 2008-January 26, 2009 0.83 920* 
   Market Peaked and Crashed in April 2008. Hit through January 2009     
Table 3C     
   Sample Period February 1992-December 2001 0.63 4398* 
Table 3D   
   Sample Period January 2002-November 2013 0.59 2911* 
*Computed Value of F>Critical Value of F 4.31; Reject the hypothesis of no persistence in the entire sample. 
We reject the hypothesis that this selected sample is the same full sample. 
90 Ahmed, Rosser, Jr., and Uppal 
Table 4 
BDS/SD Results 
Sample Period February 28, 1992-November 25, 2013 
No. of Dimensions No. of Observations BDS/SD Results 
2 5673 24.87 
3 5673 28.84 
4 5673 32.81 
Critical Value (for sample >1000, with m2) is approximately 4.70-6.92. 
 
Table 5 
 ARCH Test Based on Residuals from VAR Procedure 
Dependent Variable: RESID01; Method: ML – ARCH 
Sample (adjusted): 2/28/1992 11/25/2013; Included observations: 5672  
Convergence achieved after 64 iterations. Coefficient covariance computed using outer 
product of gradients; Pre-sample variance: back-cast (parameter = 0.7) 
GARCH = C(2) + C(3)*RESID(-1)^2 + C(4)*RESID(-2)^2 + C(5)*RESID(-3)^2 + 
C(6)*GARCH(-1) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.000276 0.000145 1.900344 0.0574 
 Variance Equation   
C 4.29E-06 3.59E-07 11.9715 0.0000 
RESID(-1)^2 0.1756 0.01256 13.9730 0.0000 
RESID(-2)^2 –0.0099 0.0182 –0.5454 0.5855 
RESID(-3)^2 –0.0638 0.0146 –4.3673 0.0000 
GARCH(-1) 0.8819 0.0063 139.7810 0.0000 
Adjusted R-squared –0.0003     Akaike info criterion –5.8968 
Log Likelihood 16729.27     Schwarz criterion –5.8898 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.0006     Hannan-Quinn criterion –5.8943 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
We have tested daily data for the Karachi stock exchange since 1992, including 
some appropriate sub-period tests, and reject the hypothesis of the absence of bubbles in 
the market, and also of nonlinearities beyond ARCH.  We did this by estimating a 
hypothesised fundamental value time series for daily data from a Vector Autoregressive 
(VAR) model with daily data on the stock market world stock market prices, the 
Pakistani foreign exchange rate, and the middle 30-day Repo interest rate.  Residuals 
from this VAR were tested for divergence using Hamilton regime switching tests and 
Hurst rescaled range statistics, with nonlinearity beyond ARCH being tested for using 
BDS statistics. 
While we have not specifically compared the KSE to other emerging and frontier 
markets with our tests, available data suggests that indeed this market has exhibited 
greater volatility than most others, certainly more so than the average performance of 
such markets.  While this performance may be partly due to technical issues, particularly 
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regarding the measurement of the KSE index, it would be unwise to argue that such 
factors fully explain this. The KSE market simply appears to be highly volatile.   
Such volatility makes it harder to sustain long-term investment for growth in the 
Pakistani economy.  Indeed, one of the reasons to believe that speculative behaviour is a 
major factor in the market’s high volatility is that the market’s recent rise  seems to be 
much greater relative to its GDP growth than one observes in other emerging and frontier 
economies.  It is unclear what the best policy to deal with this problem is. Engaging in 
excessively strict monetary policy risks dragging down an economy that is already not 
growing as rapidly as many would like and is a blunt instrument for such a policy anyway 
[Rosser, Rosser, and Gallegati (2012)]. There is also recent evidence that monetary 
policy may well have a surprisingly weak influence on stock market bubbles [Galí and 
Gambetti (2015)]. Other policies that might be used might include tighter regulation of 
margin requirements and other more specific actions directed at micro details of the 
functioning of the markets.  Of course, the fact that Pakistan faces serious problems due 
to terrorism and warfare in its region underscore the difficulty of making economic 
policy more generally in the nation. 
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